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TOWARDS A NEW MODE
OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN CIVIL MATTERS
Lewis D. Solomon*
William S. Richards**
The American litigation process has been criticized as an un-
satisfactory means of resolving civil disputes, due to overcrowded
dockets, high costs of adjudication, lengthy delays, and the neces-
sity of legal counsel. In this Article, the authors provide a
perspective on alternative modes of dispute resolution, using the
concept of "synergy," or party involvement in the resolution pro-
cess and result. After a comparative analysis of Cuban, Chinese,
and Liberian models, the authors provide specific proposals for
modifying the American adjudication process and, for appropriate
cases, developing alternative methods of conflict prevention and
conflict resolution.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger in an address to the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad-
ministration of Justice challenged Americans, and more specifically
the legal profession, to reform its system of conflict resolution. 1
Chief Justice Burger called for fundamental changes as opposed to
mere "tinkering." Although the Chief Justice directed his challenge to
the entire judicial system, the resolution of civil disputes appears
especially in need of reform. Major problems presently drawing criti-
cism include the familiar litany of overcrowded dockets, the high
costs of adjudication, lengthy delays before adjudication becomes
final, the necessity of legal counsel, and the lack of binding alterna-
tives to adjudication. These drawbacks have cut off the courts as a
means of redress for resolving disputes involving relatively minor
sums. Even when substantial sums are in dispute, litigation may drag
on for years with litigation expenses substantially reducing the recov-
ery. In short, the social costs of resolving conflict-in terms of time
*Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. B.A., Cornell Univer-
sity; J.D., Yale Law School.
**B.A., Loyola University of New Orleans; J.D., University of Missouri-Kansas City Law
School.
1. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A. D. - Need for Systema-
tic Anticipation, National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Adminis-
tration of Justice, St. Paul, Minn. (Apr. 7, 1976), reprinted in XLII VITAL SPEECHES 450 (May
15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Burger Address].
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and money-have reached significant proportions, and further in-
creases seem likely.
Furthermore, in a complex society, transaction costs 2 may reach
unmanageable proportions. 3 Like a city's street choking in rush hour
traffic, it is becoming increasingly difficult in terms of both economic
efficiency and human needs to get anything done.
Weaknesses in the adversary system, the bedrock of the Anglo-
American judicial process, may underpin these problems. The adver-
sary system undoubtedly offers some benefits, such as the opportun-
ity afforded to each litigant to present evidence unfavorable to the
opponent, thereby clarifying uncertainties. However, the adversary
process embodies a number of deficiencies. Derived from the concept
of a trial as a substitute for out-of-court brawls, the adversary legal
system encourages attorneys to excel at competition and aim at vic-
tory, often at all costs. Rather than aiding a judge to discover "facts,"
skillful trial lawyers may proceed in just the opposite direction by
concealing information, presenting material in a way which distorts
information, and by using techniques of cross-examination to confuse,
intimidate or embarrass witnesses. 4
A number of palliatives have been suggested to remedy these dif-
ficulties. More judgeships could alleviate the overcrowding of dockets
to a certain extent, provided the number of lawsuits and their com-
plexity remain constant. Litigation costs could be reduced to facilitate
access to the courts, but doing so would increase the number of liti-
gants and perpetuate the overcrowding.
Part of the growing dissatisfaction with the courts centers on the
length of time involved in litigation. Attempts to streamline justice,
that is, to secure a speedy, final resolution of disputes, must be bal-
anced against concepts of fair play. Litigants do not want a short
speedy trial if it subjectively prevents them from presenting their re-
spective side (or ventilating their feelings) to the best of their ability.
In fact, the opportunity to give a full presentation may assume more
importance than the actual decision. In Rabelais' Gargantua et Pan-
tagruel Judge Bridlegoose commented on this peculiarity of human
2. Transaction costs include the expense of mediating conflicts between groups desirous of
satisfying their needs on questions such as environmental problems and risks, as well as expen-
ditures for programs protecting consumers and the environment, overcoming the social costs of
the externalities of production and consumption, and achieving the requisite level of bureaucra-
tic coordination. See K. KAPP, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE (1950); Mishan,
The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1
(March 1971).
3. Henderson, The End of Economics, 6 THE ECOLOGIST 137 (1976).
4. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-102 (1949).
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nature. 5 Judge Bridlegoose withheld making a decision until both
sides could think of nothing more to say and then he decided the case
with a roll of the dice.
The goals of fair play and an opportunity to be heard rest upon the
assumption that the adversaries can equally afford the cost of litiga-
tion. In the United States, small claims courts in which the parties
may or must proceed pro se have attempted to equalize the litiga-
tional power position and minimize financial advantage. 6  But the
equalization remains more theoretical than real even when court rules
mandate that both parties proceed pro se. For example, a more
affluent litigant can engage counsel for trial preparation outside the
courtroom.
Well intentioned tinkering may partially alleviate the problem but
fails to go far enough. 7 More fundamental change remains necessary.
Exploration and implementation of alternatives to the present method
of conflict resolution in civil disputes must be encouraged by the bar
if for no other reason than self interest. Problems engendered by the
present judicial system may lead to a loss of credibility on the part of
the judiciary and the bar, thereby forcing the public to seek other
means for resolving disputes or to take the law into their own hands.
This article is intended not only to suggest possible solutions
applicable for contemporary America, but also to spur others to
analyze the problem of conflict resolution, assess the utility and
applicability of techniques developed by other societies and cultures,
and conceive alternate solutions. In particular, others may find the
concept of synergy useful in analyzing problems and devising creative
alternative prescriptions and recommendations.
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A perspective on alternative means of dispute resolution may be
gained through a study of the systems of other societies. Characteris-
tics such as the economic base of a society, the centralization of the
economic and political system, and the degree of authoritarianism, all
have an impact upon the viability of alternate means of conflict reso-
lution. A seemingly "new" method may also build upon or modify a
predecessor system.
5. Satire by Rabelais, excerpts found in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOsoPHY 440-45 (M. Cohen & F. Cohen eds. 1951). Satire is a useful means of social
commentary in that it can show the foibles of human nature in a humorous vein, making its
observations much more palatable without compromising their validity.
6. L. Nader and L. R. Singer, Law in the Future: What Are the Choices? (paper prepared
for a conference sponsored by the State Bar of California, September 12-14, 1975).
7. Burger Address at 6-7.
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The usefulness of such a comparative examination and the applica-
bility of alternative systems for the American situation turns on a
series of questions: Have courts universally resolved certain types of
disputes? How do the various means of conflict resolution fulfill
psychological needs and why are some forms more effective than
others? How much do culture and environment affect the forms of
dispute resolution?
After briefly setting forth the concept of synergy as a benchmark
against which dispute resolution systems may be assessed, the system
of conflict resolution used by a "primitive" society, the Kpelle of
Liberia, will be analyzed. In addition, the systems of two countries
that have undergone significant structural transformations in the post-
World War II period, Cuba and the People's Republic of China, will
be examined.
Synergy
The concept of synergy is useful in analyzing societies and, more
specifically, their systems of conflict resolution. A synergistic system
attempts to transcend the polarity between individual selfishness and
altruisn. 8 A high synergy situation exists if one person shares his or
her material good fortune with another less fortunate and receives, in
return, gratitude and respect. In short, mutuality of benefit keynotes
a system of high synergy. 9 Conversely, in a low synergy situation a
person uses his or her material goods to amass more goods without
regard to the other's immediate physical needs.10  By failing to share,
the wealthier individual incurs the wrath and resentment of the less
fortunate person.
Although an entire society may be characterized as having high or
low synergy, the concept may also be applied to a particular institu-
tion, such as a conflict resolution system. Solutions may be arrived at
consensually (high synergy) or imposed by an authority figure (low
synergy). An adversary system of dispute resolution, such as used in
the United States, possesses low synergy. Absent a compromise set-
tlement, the adversary process is a zero sum system-one side must
win and the other lose. Moreover, a judge imposes a solution; the
parties do not come to an understanding of the needs of each side, and
thus do not work out a solution themselves. Other dispute resolution
8. Maslow, Synergy in the Society and the Individual, 20 J. INDIVIDUAL PSYCH. 153, 155
(1964). See also Benedict, Synergy: Patterns of the Good Culture, 72 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
320 (1970); A. MASLOW, EUPSYCHIAN MANAGEMENT (1965).
9. Maslow, supra note 8, at 156.
10. Id. at 160.
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systems, both primitive and contemporary, can be assessed in terms
of their synergistic functioning.
Kpelle of Liberia
The study of a "primitive" society, such as the Kpelle of Liberia,
affords the opportunity of discovering and analyzing alternative means
of dispute resolution. "Primitive" does not necessarily mean "less
complex." Such societies often employ quite elaborate conflict resolu-
tion systems and utilize various processes according to the type of
dispute. The various forums and their interactions can be examined at
a community level in a "primitive society" rather than at the broader,
and usually more diverse, macro-level of so-called "advanced"
societies.
The Kpelle of Liberia use a dual conflict resolution system-a reg-
ular court and a moot. The two Kpelle systems stress catharsis, but
the choice of forum depends upon whether the parties desire recon-
ciliation (in which case a moot is used) or a binding decision (in which
case a regular court is used). Other factors which enter into the
choice of forum decision include whether or not the parties must
coexist together thereafter and whether a dispute is regarded as per-
sonal or more community-orieited because of the existence of familial
and neighborly ties. The regular court system handles disputes be-
tween or among unrelated individuals; it is rarely used by the Kpelle
to resolve family or community disputes. The litigants in a regular
court dispute usually have no relationship that survives the resolution
of a proceeding.
In a regular court, litigants air their grievances and a judge arbi-
trarily renders a decision. The case reaches a court only after a rela-
tively long passage of time during which the parties have had an op-
portunity to air their emotions and fix their opinions concerning the
dispute. Each side presents its version at a hearing in open court.
The judge pronounces a decision based on a gut level reaction disre-
garding precedent.'"
Although not operating as a high synergy institution like a moot,
the regular court enables litigants to have "their day in court" and
resume their everyday lives. The adjudication relegates the dispute to
the past. The testimony phase produces, moreover, a cathartic ef-
fect12 on the parties by allowing them to express their aggressions
11. Gibbs, Jr., Poro Values and Courtroom Procedures in a Kpelle Chiefdom, 18 Sw. J.
ANTHROPOLOGY 341, 343-44, 347 (1962).
12. A catharsis involves a purification or purgation of emotions thereby leading to a satisfying
release from tension. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 353 (3d ed. 1966).
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and hostilities. Catharsis is most effective when attitudes have be-
come fixed. The delay between the dispute and the trial permits
emotions to cool and attitudes to become fixed. Because a third party
(rather than the litigants) makes the ultimate decision, a sense of
inner tranquility fills the parties, who no longer regard a matter as
being in their hands. The feeling of inner tranquility, rather than
futility, may emanate from the authoritarian structure of Kpelle soci-
ety.
The Kpelle use a moot as the primary forum for resolving disputes
between individuals who will have a continuing relationship after the
settlement of the conflict. The moot resolves a total situation, not a
single act. For example, breaches in family relationships are rarely
attributable to a single event; such problems result from tensions
brewing over a period of time.
The effectiveness of the Kpelle moot in resolving family and
neighborhood disputes rests, in part, on informality. 13 The com-
plainant selects a relative, who is also a village elder, to preside over
the moot which is held in the complainant's home. The parties invite
relatives and neighbors to attend the proceedings. At a moot, each
litigant is encouraged to speak freely and to discuss any matter
whether or not directly related to the proceeding. Emotional out-
bursts during the moot are acceptable as long as they do not become
totally disruptive of the proceedings or constitute personal verbal at-
tacks on others. Outbursts release pent up tensions and yield consid-
erable insight into the cause of an individual's troubles. 14 The judge
acts as moderator to prevent emotional displays from degenerating
into a shouting match.
The presence of an audience enhances the therapeutic effect be-
cause the effusion of emotion generates empathy. The community
feels entitled to contribute to the process because a dispute is likely
to affect the community. Volunteer witnesses from the audience are
encouraged to testify. By allowing the members of the community to
state their opinions, a sense of catharsis also arises within the com-
munity. 15
The non-binding judicial decision gains acceptance from a number
of sources. The decision is accompanied by an explanation and lecture
directed to both parties as to why they were wrong in behaving as
they did. The judge couches the tone of the decision in precatory,
13. Gibbs, Jr., The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the Informal Settlement of Dis-
putes, 33 AFR. J. INT'L AFR. INSTITUTION 1, 2 (1963).
14. Id. at 3, 5-7. The emotional outbursts act as a form of primal scream therapy.
15. Id. at 6.
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but not condemnatory, terms. 16 The mere fact that the parties felt
that the matter was important enough to merit some type of resolu-
tion, as evidenced by their presence at the moot, contributes to the
acceptance of the decision. 17 Community pressure builds to abide by
a decision if it is regarded as fair. Community pressure also tends to
temper the judge's decision; the resolution must be a popular one.18
The Kpelle moot evidences a high level of synergy by performing a
conciliatory function. Through a consensus regarding future actions,
the resolution strives to produce a sense of satisfaction in all the
parties, including members of the community who have taken sides
during the formative phases of the grievance and who testify at the
proceedings. Reconciliation of the parties who must coexist after the
decision constitutes the primary focus of the moot, which seeks to
involve members of the community in the decision-making process.
The moot would possess only limited utility in resolving disputes
among virtual strangers. A pre-existing sense of community enhances
the effectiveness of the moot. In most areas of the United States, for
example, individuals barely know their neighbors' names, let alone
care about their problems. In the United States, if a dispute is li-
mited to a single incident, the breastbeating and outpouring of emo-
tions characteristic of the moot would constitute a wasted effort be-
cause no one has enough invested in a relationship to be sufficiently
concerned.
In addition, the Kpelle, a nonmobile society, lack many of the
means of dispute resolution used in the United States. Because of
their mobility, Americans use (at least in times of abundance) a low
synergy institution- avoidance. 19 Running from a problem may be
far easier than risking a confrontation. Avoidance, however, fails to
resolve the dispute which remains with the parties, at least in their
subconscious. Avoidance generally will not produce a catharsis. But
the Kpelle live in a nonmobile society. The desirability of clearing the
air and starting anew are apparent.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id. at 4.
19. For a debate on the merits of avoidance and mediation in the United States, with a
discussion of the psychological and economic costs of avoidance, the coercive power of com-
munity and other groups through peer pressure, see Danzig & Lowy, Everyday Disputes and
Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 675 (1975);
Felstiner, Avoidance As Dispute Processing: An Elaboration, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 695 (1975);
Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 63
(1974).
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Cuba
Since 1966, the primary dispute resolution device in Cuba has
been the popular tribunal. Civil subject matter jurisdiction is vested
in the tribunals over torts (up to a maximum monetary limit), juvenile
matters, personal quarrels, arguments, and grudges. The tribunals do
not hear contract disputes, unless based on fraud or deceit. 20
Fidel Castro has ruled Cuba as an authoritarian centralized society,
and only recently has undertaken a program of political decentraliza-
tion. 21 Although the popular tribunals infuse a certain degree of
political rhetoric into their decisions, the tribunals comprise a decen-
tralized system of conflict resolution. A popular tribunal serves a zone
of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 people.
Personnel for the tribunal, who are drawn from a local zone, con-
sist of an "asesore," who is a lawyer or fourth year law student, and
six lay judges, only three of whom sit on a panel at one time. The
asesore performs a supervisory function by assisting the judges on a
point of law if they request it. The asesore's power over the judges
comes into play at the appellate level when he or she can rectify
abuses of judicial discretion. 22 People residing in a zone elect judges
whom the Communist Party has previously selected for three weeks
of training in the concepts and techniques embodied in the judges'
manual. This limited period of training comprises a judge's legal edu-
cation. The lay judges, who continue to hold a regular fill-time job
during the day, serve without pay for an indeterminate period, which
is theoretically as long as they continue to satisfy their constituency. 23
The chronology of a typical case is as follows. After the filing of a
complaint with a popular tribunal, one of the judges, following the
inquisitorial tradition, investigates the case, interviews witnesses, and
examines other evidence. Each case usually is heard within two
months of the alleged offense. At the formal hearing before the three
judges, both parties present their versions of the dispute. The judges
20. Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1321-22 (1969). The
Tribunals continued in existence as late as 1971 (several years after their rumored demise). See
E. CARDENAL, IN CUBA 39 (1974).
In 1974, a new judicial system was created in Cuba. N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
Modifications in the legal system are detailed in the new Cuban Code of the Judiciary, cur-
rently being translated from the Spanish by the Library of Congress. The new Code is available
at the Hispanic Law Division of the Law Library of the Library of Congress.
21. N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1975, at 30, col. 1; Feb. 16, 1976, at 8, col. 1; Feb. 17, 1976, at 2,
col. 5.
22. Berman, supra note 20, at 1337-38.
23. Id. at 1335-36. The heavy hand of an authoritarian society, specifically the Communist
Party, in controlling the selection and removal of lay judges must not be forgotten.
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use the inquisitorial method of examination because it was felt that an
adversary system would contravene the ideal of the people working in
unison. The judges encourage testimony by volunteer witnesses from
the audience who may illuminate a disputed factual issue. After the
open hearing the judges retire to deliberate on the prior investigatory
work and on the testimony before the tribunal. The judges then de-
liver a unanimous verdict accompanied by a lecture couched in pre-
catory language. 24
The popular tribunals have departed from the Cuban civil code
tradition. Use of equitable principles assumes paramount importance
as the judges strive to conform their decision to the unique cir-
cumstances of a situation. In arriving at a decision the judges' manual
guides the lay judges. The manual evolved from statutes selected
from a pre-revolutionary legal code and other new statutory provi-
sions designed to effectuate the realization of the socialist state to-
gether with commentary illustrating the application of the statutory
materials. In the final form of the judges' manual, the statutory sec-
tions were expurgated leaving only the commentary which illustrates
the application of legal principles while stressing the -uniqueness of
each case. The manual serves only as a guide. Neither statutes nor
precedent constrain the judges except as they desire consistency
among their decisions.2 5
Limited' appellate review exists in the Cuban dispute resolution
system. 26 Only the verdict or the severity of the verdict, not
procedural errors, may be appealed by a party or an asesore. The
judges rendering the verdict hear appeals regarding severity, while
an asesore and two other judges of the zone who did not sit on the
panel hear appeals regarding the verdict that evening. Appeals are
usually processed on the same evening as the original hearing.
The popular tribunals operate as a high synergy system on a
number of' levels. First, the tribunals provide a conflict resolution
forum to individuals who previously could not afford access to the
judicial process. There are no filing fees. An attorney is not needed.
A tribunal's informal procedure enables parties to proceed pro se,
without fear of' running afoul of technicalities.
Secondly, the tribunals meet one night per week so that people in
a zone can easily attend the public sessions. The public nature of the
proceedings encourages empathy between the disputants and the au-
dience characteristic of most high synergy dispute resolution devices.
24. Id. at 1344, 1345.
25. Id. at 1336-37.
26. Id. at 1345.
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Another source of empathy derives from the use of lay judges. The
disputants perceive the judges as human beings dealing with real
problems and not robed persons who have lost touch with reality. 27
A corollary of empathy is the cathartic effect on parties and witnesses
when testimony may be freely given.
Thirdly, use of lay judges who conduct informal proceedings in an
unpretentious meeting hall serves to demystify the process. 28 The
lecture accompanying the decision clarifies the reasons for the judges'
conclusion, thereby facilitating an understanding of the decision. 29
This explanation meets the needs of the audience as well as the dis-
putants. Since the proceedings are open to the public and constitute
a form of entertainment, the judges' decision must meet with popular
approval; the audience serves as an unofficial court of last appeal. The
lecture also gives the tribunal an opportunity to digress on why the
judges regard certain behavior as antisocial and to be avoided by
everyone. Despite the political overtones, the judges place primary
emphasis on the equitable resolution of the dispute at hand; the
political object lesson occupies an incidental position. The lecture
blurs the distinction between winner and loser since it usually chas-
tises both parties, thereby taking note of the fact that the equities are
rarely, if ever, solely on one side. 30 In short, the lecture emphasizes
the mutuality of benefits and burdens, which are important elements
of a high synergy system.
The benefits of the appellate procedure appear mixed. On the one
hand, the appellate procedure avoids lengthy delays in reaching final
adjudication. But appeals are cursory in nature. Because most appeals
are heard by the same judges who rendered the verdict, doubt exists
as to impartiality of the appeal process. The lack of impartiality
weakens or defeats the underlying rationale for appeals, i.e., the de-
sire to obtain an unbiased second opinion.
China
In the People's Republic of China, the primary mode of dispute
resolution is mediation. Mediation resolves approximately 80% of all
27. Id. at 1318.
28. Id. at 1343.
29. A panel of three judges protects the disputants against bias on the part of any single
judge. The requirement of unanimity in the announced decision strengthens the parties' accep-
tance of its binding nature. If dissenting opinions were permitted, a losing party might never
regard the dispute as being resolved, even after exhausting appeal procedures. The losing party
could point to the dissent in support of his or her position.
30. Berman, supra note 20, at 1329.
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disputes brought before all conflict resolution bodies in China, with
courts settling the other 20%.31
China has been and is a "shame" society rather than a "guilt" soci-
ety. In a shame culture, the emphasis is placed upon society's judg-
ment of one's actions. Individuals are "shamed" if they must admit
publicly their failure to act appropriately. This type of culture differs
from a guilt society, in which the underlying circumstances contribu-
ting to an offender's behavior are important. In a guilt society, the
focus is on the individual and his or her conscience, not on humilia-
tion before the society in general. 32  Adjudication as a means of dis-
pute resolution failed to take hold in China because adjudication con-
stitutes an admission that the parties were unable to reach a mutually
acceptable solution.3 3 Such a device is unacceptable to the Chinese,
who are vulnerable to the shame automatically arising from failure to
resolve the dispute amicably themselves. Mediation avoids this public
admission of failure.
In the past, a village elder conducted traditional mediation pro-
ceedings with the parties representing themselves, thereby avoiding
the cost (and perhaps the contentiousness) of counsel. Mediation was
conducted in an informal manner.3 4 Mediation was often public and
took advantage of the fact that China is a shame society. The
mediator publicly admonished the parties, and the "offending" party
was ostracized by the community until he or she atoned through vari-
ous acts, such as paying for the tea consumed during the mediation,
furnishing a feast or entertainment for the community, or whatever
else seemed equitable under the circumstances. Social ostracism
comprised an effective sanction in a decentralized, nonmobile society.
The "offending" party was not required to compensate the "harmed"
31. J. Cohen, Drafting People's Mediation Rules for China's Cities, in LEGAL THOUGHT IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES 312 (J. Hazard & W.
Wagner eds. 1970). See generally S. LENG, JUSTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1967); F. LIN,
CHINESE LAW PAST AND PRESENT (1966); H. SCHURMAN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN
COMMUNIST CHINA (1966); Brown, Jr., Present-Day Law in the People's Republic of China, 61
A.B.A.J. 474 (1975); Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1201 (1966); Huang, Reflections on Law and the Economy in the People's Republic of
China, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 261 (1973); Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and
Development, 60 MICH. L. REv. 439 (1962); Li, The Role of Law in Communist China, 44
CHINA Q. 66 (1970); Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Com-
munist China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284 (1967); Woodsworth, Family Law and Resolution of
Domestic Disputes in the People's Republic of China, 13 MCGILL L.J. 169 (1967).
32. Weiss, The East German Social Courts: Development and Comparison with China, 20
AM. J. COMP. L. 266, 288 (1972).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 284.
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individual. Reputation was important in a small community from
which there was no viable means of escape. 35
After a brief and disastrous experiment with adjudication as the
primary means of dispute resolution (from Sun Yat Sen's revolution in
1911 to the Communist takeover in 1949), the Chinese returned to
mediation. Adjudication was costly and time-consuming, and the
courts were poorly equipped, in terms of judicial and support per-
sonnel, to deal with the heavy caseloads. 36 In reinstating mediation
the Communists imbued mediation with the new function of political
behavior control while retaining its original function of educating
people to live harmoniously. 37
Mediation committees were created for the factories, streets
(neighborhoods), governmental agencies, and other social, economic,
and political units. 38 The mediators, selected primarily from Com-
munist Party membership, implement policies directed by the party.
Such policies go beyond the parameters of "li," or customary law,
which is based on the concept of people functioning harmoniously as
a society. The mediators remain responsive to the public bureaucracy
which prepares the slate of mediator candidates. 39
Mediation proceedings are held before a committee composed of
three to eleven members of a "unit." 40 Membership of the individu-
als of the mediation committee and the disputants in a common so-
cial, political, or economic unit permits empathy and lends greater
weight to the mediator's proposals for resolution. Group cohesiveness
also strengthens the effectiveness of mediation.
The mediation proceedings are held at night or on holidays so as
not to interfere with economic production. 41 However, the under-
lying reason for such scheduling of procedures is probably that on-
the-spot mediation, the previous method, caught the disputants and
mediators in the heat of the moment, thereby compromising their
ability to settle a dispute objectively. 42 No appeal from mediation
35. Id. at 286-87.
36. Cohen, supra note 31, at 300.
37. Lubman, Methodological Problems in Studying Chinese Communist 'Civil Law', in CON-
TEMP. CHINESE L. 233 (J. Cohen ed. 1967).
38. S. LENG, supra note 31, at 92.
39. Cohen, supra note 31, at 305.
40. Id.
41. S. LENG, supra note 31, at 92.
42. Although on-the-spot mediation has generally fallen into disrepute, the street committee
mediators may still rush to a dispute and mediate on the spot. However, the success rate in
such instances is quite low unless the parties themselves request the mediator to intervene.
Lubman, supra note 31, at 1320-21. (Judge Bridlegoose in Gargantua et Pantagruel also
commented on the inadvisability of attempting to resolve disputes before being asked because
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exists, nor is there any need for it since the mediators have no official
coercive power. Nevertheless, mediation is generally regarded as
binding since the findings and the result must be registered. Al-
though the dispute may be taken to court at any time, the courts,
despite their general powers of review, usually limit their jurisdiction
to reviewing abuses in the mediation process, such as fraud.4 3
The Chinese system rates well on the synergy scale because media-
tion, which is sought by the parties, uses informal methods to arrive
at a result which meets the needs of both sides. Dispute resolution is
achieved without attorneys or legally trained judges, at low or mini-
mal cost, and is speedy. Resolution is usually accomplished within
seven to ten days after the matter is brought to the attention of the
mediators. Open proceedings conducted by peers, which capitalize on
the public pressures endemic to a shame society,4 4 strengthen the
synergic effect of the process.
Mediation in China functions among a large populace. In contrast
to the United States, however, Chinese society is authoritarian,
agrarian, technically less complex, nonmobile, and characterized by a
sense of community and group cohesion. In short, strong informal
sanctioning powers exist in the Chinese system.
Adaptation of the Chinese form of mediation to the United States
would encounter several problems. First, mediation committees are
vested with nearly unlimited flexibility, 45 which, when coupled with
the admittedly political nature of mediation, makes the proceedings
somewhat arbitrary. Second, the Chinese system is based upon the
concept of shame, whereas the American adversary system is based
upon findings of fault.
PROPOSED APPLICATION OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
DEVICES IN THE UNITED STATES
Although the problems of conflict resolution facing the United
States cannot be solved by transferring a foreign system or techniques
in toto because of deeply rooted social, economic, and political sys-
tem differences, much can be learned from examining foreign sys-
the individuals regard the disputes as a private affair. READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 443.)
43. Cohen, supra note 31, at 320.
44. Weiss, supra note 32, at 286.
45. The courts in China have the power to review mediation decisions, but statutory au-
thority fails to indicate whether all such decisions are reviewable, a logistically impossible task,
or under what circumstances decisions are or should be reviewed. Cohen, supra note 31, at
320.
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tems. For example, the social order and conflict resolution machinery
reflect and complement each other. High synergy institutions may
develop more readily in decentralized economic and political sys-
tems 46 and in societies characterized by less emphasis on individual
and economic competition and lacking wide disparities in levels of
status, income and wealth holdings. 47 As Maslow observed,
What did matter was that the secure, high-synergy societies had
what she [Ruth Benedict] called a siphon system of wealth distribu-
tion, whereas the insecure, low synergy cultures had what she
called funnel mechanisms of wealth distribution. I can summarize
funnel mechanisms very briefly, metaphorically; they are any social
arrangement that guarantees that wealth attracts wealth, that to
him that hath is given and from him that hath not is taken away,
that poverty makes more poverty and wealth makes more wealth. 48
Assuming the improbability of significant changes in social structure
and public attitudes and the inability of a conflict resolution system to
initiate and effectuate such far-reaching shifts, Chief Justice Burger's
challenge turns on an assessment of efforts at change within an im-
personal, mobile, bureaucratic society which lacks a sense of com-
munity.
The preceding analysis of the Kpelle, Cuban and Chinese modes of
conflict resolution develops three points. First, the present adversary
process should be demystified. Procedures and laws should be
simplified, or at least clarified, so that individuals might proceed
without counsel; attorneys may become a disruptive influence. 49
With respect to court procedures, this would be a feasible project and
a desirable one even if the purpose were not to permit persons to
proceed pro se. Many lawyers, who are often confused by complex
court procedures, would benefit from simplification. The task of
simplification of the laws and regulations 50 may border on the impos-
46. For an analysis of possibilities of economic and political decentralization, see Solomon, A
Reply to Former Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon: Towards a Theory of a Par-
ticipatory Society, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 624 (1977).
47. See Maslow, Synergy in the Society and in the Individual, in A. MASLOW, THE
FARTHER REACHES OF HUMAN NATURE 203-05 (1971). See also Solomon, Toward a Federal
Policy on Work: Restructuring the Governance of Corporations, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1263,
1337-38 (1975).
48. Maslow, supra note 47, at 203.
49. For a penetrating critique of attorneys, see F. RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS (2d
ed. 1957).
50. For an analysis of possible areas of simplication within the federal income tax system,
see Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1974). See also
Roberts, A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAx L. REV. 325 (1972); Surrey,
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sible if they are to be simplified to a degree such that lay individuals
could both understand them and comprehend their ramifications. But
legislation and administrative rulemaking may effectively lessen con-
flict by prospectively establishing clear-cut standards defining rela-
tionships, duties and obligations instead of the tradition morass of
confusing and ambiguous legislation. Even an assessment, prior to
enactment, of the impact of new legislation on the judicial system,
in terms of an added caseload volume, might help.
Demystification may also be effectuated by requiring judges to cast
aside their robes, the cult of superiority and judicial jargon. 51 As
Jerome Frank observed: "Unfrock the judge, have him dress like or-
dinary men, become in appearance like his fellows, and he may well
be more inclined to talk and write more comprehensibly. Plain dress
may encourage plain speaking." '5 2
Conducting judicial proceedings in more informal settings, perhaps
in neighborhood courtrooms, in the home of a party, or in a com-
munity meeting place, and holding sessions at times suitable to
participants, may promote a greater degree of freely given testimony
which in turn may facilitate factfinding. But the advantages of infor-
mality must be balanced against the respect for the judiciary, par-
ticularly the efficacy of the sanctioning system. Religious institutions
or community pressure previously resolved disputes which American
courts today handle. Dissatisfaction with such means of resolving dis-
putes resulted, in large measure, from a lack of coercive power to
enforce decisions. The judicial system remains a popular dispute-re-
solving system because of its coercive sanctioning power. In a more
relaxed judicial process, care must be taken to impress the parties
with the solemnity of the system so that they will abide by a decision.
This may be difficult to achieve, as evidenced by the juvenile court
system in the United States where informality usually leads to bewil-
derment or contempt for the whole process. 53 Any system will prob-
ably include a considerable amount of ritual, such as the signing of
agreements by disputants, to increase compliance.
Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of Management of Tax Detail, 34 L.
CONTEMP. PROB. 673 (1969). See generally Cavers, Simplification of Government Regulations, 8
FED. B.J. 339 (1947). President Jimmy Carter has called for clarity in regulations promulgated
by the United States Government. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1977 § 4, at 14, col. 1; Turning
Federalese into 'Plain English', Bus. WEEK, May 9, 1977, at 58.
51. J. FRANK, supra note 4. See also, Weinstein, Let the People Observe Their Courts,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 31, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
52. J. FRANK, supra note 4, at 259.
53. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 694
(1966).
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A revamped conflict resolution system should draw on the concepts
of synergy and attempt to bring the contending parties together with
the process and the outcome performing at least four functions. 54
First, the resolution forum should enable both sides to determine
their needs, fears and expectations and their different value orien-
tations. In short, open, honest communication and discussion must be
a goal. Involvement of the community through testimony of local in-
dividuals may prove helpful. Secondly, the remedial options, material
and psychological, and the root causes of disputes 55 must be assessed
carefully with an emphasis on the means to advance the well-being of
all. A court may play only a limited role because of an inability to
implement far-reaching social, economic, and political changes or to
use technology imaginatively. Legislative and/or executive-administra-
tive units may play a greater role-particularly in devising preventa-
tive measures. Thirdly, the alternative solutions must be connected
with human concerns and emphasis placed on strategies to advance
the well-being of the disputants and society as a whole. Rather than
viewing a dispute in isolation, conflict should be perceived within a
total social context. Lay people may function effectively as judges if
provided with exposure to conflict resolution techniques; an indi-
vidual trained in psychology or sociology would be useful. If lay
judges are used, they should be imbued with the concept of social
accountability and the social impact of the conflict resolution process.
This could be accomplished through a screening test, such as those
given to the judges on the Cuban tribunals examining their know-
ledge and application of the judges' manual. Finally, the disputants
must see how a preferred solution will satisfy their needs. A synergis-
tically-oriented conflict resolution system may place in grave doubt
the efficacy and desirability of the adversary process.
54. J. CRAIG & M. CRAIG, SYNERGIC POWER: BEYOND DOMINATION AND PERMISSIVENESS
(1974).
55. This points the way for policymakers to consider the structural changes requisite to a
fulfillment of societal and individual needs. As C. Wright Mills noted:
Perhaps the most fruitful distinction with which the sociological imagination
works is between 'the personal troubles of milieu' and 'the public issues of social
structure.' This distinction is an essential tool of the sociological imagination and
a feature of all classic work in social science.
Troubles occur within the character of the individual and within the range of
his immediate relations with others; they have to do with his self and with those
limited areas of social life of which he is directly and personally aware . . . . A
trouble is a private matter: values cherished by an individual are felt by him to
be threatened.
Issues have to do with matters that transcend these local environments of the
individual and the range of hi4 inner life. They have to do with the organization
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Synergistic processes have been used to handle conflicts between
the police and local communities in Houston and in Grand Rapids,
Michigan. 56 Mediation, particularly the removal of each sides' frus-
tration in its inability to communicate its viewpoint effectively, is
starting to be used in the environmental field 57 and in certain ex-
perimental efforts to keep disputes out of court. 58 But for mediation
to be effective each party must realize that it cannot win everything
and that it may lose all. Mediation also requires assurance that an
agreement will be implemented.
Care must be taken to focus on the negative aspects of a synergy
model, however. First, the concept of synergy is based on an abun-
dance of resources. As Maslow noted, "when we are healthy enough
to perceive the higher unity, when the world is good enough and
wealthy enough so that there is no scarcity, then we can see that our
interests as human beings are pooled and what benefits one person
benefits me or benefits anybody else for that matter .... .59 A
world of diminishing resources and energy challenges the underpin-
ning of synergy. Second, the disputants may not identify with the
mediator, because of race or class, among other factors, or the
mediator may not identify with the disputants, thereby weakening the
viability of the process. Although mediators may seek to establish
modes of open communication and thereby bridge the gap between
themselves and the parties, community residents probably make the
best mediators. Third, structural and organizational problems may
of many such milieux into the institutions of an historical society as a whole,
with the ways in which various milieux overlap and interpenetrate to form the
larger structure of social and historical life. An issue. is a public matter: some
value cherished by publics is felt to be threatened. Often there is a debate
about what that value really is and about what it is that really threatens it. This
debate is often without focus if only because it is the very nature of an issue,
unlike even widespread trouble, that it cannot very well be defined in terms of
the immediate and everyday environments of ordinary men ....
C. MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 8-9 (1959).
56. In Houston, for example, conflicts between the community and police were handled
through implementation of a small group interaction program involving police and commun-
ity members. Full opportunity for interchange of attitudes was provided at the group meet-
ings. See Bell, Cleveland, Hanson & O'Connell, Small Group Dialogue and Discussion: An
Approach to Police-Community Relationships, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCL
242, 242-43 (1969). See also J. CRAIG & M. CRAIG, supra note 54; Allen, Pitnick &
Silverzweig, Conflict Resolution: Team Building for Police and Ghetto Residents (paper pre-
sentated at Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Ass'n, San Francisco,
California, Aug. 30-Sept. 3, 1968).
57. Removing the Rancor from Tough Disputes, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 30, 1976, at 50.
58. Hochberger, A New Approach to Resolve Private Quarrels, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1977,
at 1, col. 3; Lawscope, 63 A.B.A.J. 471 (1977).
59. A. MASLOW, supra note 8, at 96.
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form a basis of what appears to be personal grievance. Disparities in
economic and social power positions between disputants, engendered
by varying levels of status, income and wealth, may reduce the effec-
tiveness of a synergistic conflict resolution system. Finally, the effec-
tiveness of any particular dispute resolution device varies according to
the relationships between or among the parties and/or the type of
dispute. Nonadversary, synergistic processes will be more useful in
areas where the parties deal with each other on a continuing basis
and where the latest incident is a symptom of a long-standing prob-
lem-such as marital fights, custody battles between divorced
spouses, juvenile or landlord-tenant matters, and disputes between
neighbors.
These factors must be taken into account in restructuring any con-
flict resolution system. For example, the modernization process and
the concomitant increase in the complexity of society has forced
China to deal with new types of disputes and more impersonal re-
lationships. In contract disputes, the Chinese increasingly use negoti-
ation, that is, the structuring of mutually acceptable contract provi-
sions covering rights, duties and obligations, as a preventive measure.
Arbitration is used as a conflict resolution device. 60 It involves
quasi-adjudicatory methods and strives to attain a mutually acceptable
interpretation of a contractual provision after an alleged breach. In
the absence of such an agreement, an arbitrator formulates a binding
solution. But arbitration possesses many of the same time and cost
objections as traditional adjudication. Arbitration, moreover, requires
a degree of expertise and knowledge commensurate with a dispute.
Expertise in a variety of specialized areas and disciplines may consti-
tute a prerequisite for innovative conflict resolution methods. Such
expertise may be forthcoming through the creation of multidisci-
plinary panels.
Explicit recognition must be given to the uniqueness of each situa-
tion. The occidental (Roman) tradition strives to resolve disputes
through the application of "impartial" rules of law. But mechanistic
jurisprudence fails to consider two factors: (1) the "rules" are not
likely to be neutral, but probably tavor particular classes, groups or
interests; and (2) courts individualize grievances by subjective fact-
finding and through the use of an overall reaction (or Gestalt) to a
total situation. 61 The degree of flexibility possessed by Chinese
mediation committees also contravenes a widely accepted Western
60. Lobman, supra note 37, at 249; Cohen supra note 31, at 328.
61. J. FRANK, supra note 4; Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of
"'Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
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ideal that predictability is a desirable component of a legal system,
provided that predictability does not turn into arbitrariness through a
purely mechanical application of legal rules.
A conflict resolution system which deals with the needs of the par-
ties without reliance on formalities or precedent may prove effective
in handling a number of grievances. 62 The Cuban judges' manual,
which encourages the desired flexibility in formulating a solution
while being sufficiently definite to provide a certain measure of
helpful standards to improve the degree of predictability, may point
the way to future creative efforts.
In the United States, heavy reliance on precedent may be attribut-
able to the prevailing system of legal education. The casebook ap-
proach encourages law students to glean a "rule of law" from a case
rather than treating a case as an illustration of flexibility within a sys-
tem. The use of precedent as a mechanical application of "rules"
could be halted by encouraging students to focus on cases only as
illustrations and by promoting a far-reaching contextual analysis of so-
cial policy and values. 63 Perhaps judges could take the lead in re-
educating practicing attorneys to argue the uniqueness of each case
and the underlying social policy questions presented, not merely the
mechanical application of a rule of law.
As an alternative to, or in conjunction with, new modes of conflict
resolution, more attention should focus on preventative measures,
such as legislation and administrative rule-making. In transactions
susceptible to planning, authoritative approval could be secured prior
to consummation. Services of attorneys with planning and problem-
solving skills would be required to structure and draft such transac-
tions. For example, a court review, prior to a testator's death, of the
formalities of execution of a testator's will, the precision with which a
will is drafted, and the testator's mental capacity and freedom from
undue influence would reduce the possibility for a post mortem will
contest.6 4  In corporate and securities transactions, judicial or ad-
ministrative review could be secured prior to the consummation of a
62. The Greeks individualized cases with apparently excellent results. Calhoun, The
Jurisprudence of the Greek City, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 154 (1924).
63. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
64. See Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, 1 U. Cm. L. REV.
440 (1934); Fink, Ante Mortem Probate Revisited: Can An Idea Have a Life After Death, 37
OHIO ST. L. J. 264 (1976); Kutschen, Living Probate, 21 A.B.A.J. 427 (1935). See also
Comment, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: A Psychiatric Reevaluation, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 1119, 1143-46 (1966) (proposing an ante mortem psychiatric examination of testators).
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transaction. 65  Premarital compatability counseling could be required
prior to marriage. Mechanisms for the resolution of consumer dis-
putes could be incorporated into written contract warranties. 66
Prior review systems pose several types of problems. First, advance
approval may initially place a greater burden on courts and adminis-
trative gencies. But over the long run, such a system would unclog
conflict resolution machinery by quickly resolving problems before
they become full blown disputes. Repetitive problems could be: dis-
posed of speedily. The strain of.re'solving difficult gray area questions
might prod the development of legislative and/or administrative
guidelines. Second, prior review may-be of limited utility for disputes
concerning unforeseen events, particularly problems caused by con-
tractual omissions. If the problems had been foreseeable, they could
have been avoided by skillful counsel or by use of risk allocation
machinery, such as insurance. Third, in the probate area, individuals
who receive little or nothing under a will comprise the contestants.
Advance approval would necessitate the joinder of all potential heirs
with a testator's proposed disposition becoming known among this
group. If confidentiality were to be maintained, the testator could be
required to list his or her potential heirs and justify the distribution,
or the lack thereof, to each. The concepts of due process, notice, and
res judicata may need to undergo revision to make the prior approval
binding on all parties, whether or not joined in an action. 67
In the area of transactions not susceptible to planning, particularly
disputes concerning accidents, the allocation of responsibility for in-
jury can be reassessed and imposed on the individual or entity best
able to shoulder the burden, or on society at large. For example, in
many areas of product liability, strict liability has been imposed to
protect the consumer and to facilitate assertion of consumer rights.
But the concept of strict liability remains an anomaly in a guilt-
oriented society. A legislative solution, such as strict liability, will not
comprise a complete conflict resolution system because of the exis-
tence of disputes regarding the applicability of the strict liability stan-
65. Solomon & Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule lob-5: Legal Standards, Industry
Practices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 505,
544-46 (1975) (proposal for Securities and Exchange Commission no-action telephone system
to obtain a speedy administrative opinion as to a proposed course of action). See also Sol-
omon, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals
for Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141 (1975).
66. For an analysis of the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Act, see
Rothschild, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Does It Balance Warrantor and Consumer
Interests, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335, 353-380 (1976).
67. Fink, supra note 64.
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dard and the type and the extent of the remedy. Perhaps the parties
to a suit for damages could submit the controversy to an administra-
tive agency or to an arbitrator or mediator possessing expertise con-
cerning that particular type of dispute. Agencies and arbitration/
mediation boards could be set up to deal with disputes that courts of
general jurisdiction are not competent to handle because of the com-
plexity of the case or the specialized knowledge required. Alterna-
tively, specialized courts could be substituted for agencies and arbit-
ration/mediation in this scheme. Society must, of course, bear the-
costs of providing such specialized services.
Some disputes, such as divorce battles, could be regulated out of
existence. No-fault divorce actions exemplify the trend to quasi-ad-
ministrative proceedings.
Finally, traditional constitutional doctrine which focuses upon indi-
vidual rights vis-a-vis governmental units could be supplemented (or
even supplanted) by policies focusing upon the individual's relation-
ship to organizations within the society.68 Whether such a significant
revision of constitutional doctrine and policy could be achieved is
doubtful, but attention must be directed to the bureaucratic nature of
the modern social order. Such structural issues remain high on the
agenda for future policy-makers.
Access to a forum remains crucial to dispute resolution whether the
forum involves adjudication, arbitration, or mediation. New forums or
policy standards would fail to meet expectations if cost barriers exist.
Two such barriers, filing fees and the cost of counsel, must be over-
come. The governmental units should pay administrative costs out of
general revenues and dispense with filing fees, thereby affording all
individuals an opportunity to be heard. A private insurance system 69
(individual or group legal plans), a public system of compensation for
attorneys (in a manner similar to the public sector reimbursement
under the Medicare and Medicaid programs), 70 or the nationalization
of the legal profession .(by placing attorneys on the payroll of public
sector organizations) may provide access to counsel for more individu-
68. For an analysis of a traditional constitutional rights issue using a holistic policy
analysis based on individual and organizational needs, see Solomon & Hetter, Affirmative
Action in Higher Education: Towards a Rationale for Preference, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41
(1976). See generally Solomon, supra note 47.
69. See, e.g., Insurance to Cover the Lawyer's Bill, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 18, 1977, at 46;
Pfennigstorf, Legal Expense Insurance, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 451 (1975).
70. The constitutional right of an indigent to counsel does not extend to civil litigation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V1. See Cole & Greenberger, Staff Attorneys v. Judicare: A Cost
Analysis, 50 J. URB. L. 705 (1973); Preloznik, Wisconsin Judicare, 25 BmEF CASE 91 (1967);
Robb, Alternate Legal Assistance Plans, 14 CATH. LAw. 127 (1968).
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als. A private insurance scheme suffers from the weakness that poten-
tial litigants may be unable to afford the coverage or that coverage
may be unavailable to them. The cost burden of public systems, as
well as the opposition of the organized bar, constitute difficult obsta-
cles to their ready adoption. Reducing cost barriers will, however,
increase the number of people seeking access to legal systems and
thus clog the courts anew.
The appellate process remains a lingering problem. Under the
present system, appeals are expensive and delay the finality of a deci-
sion. Speed and impartiality constitute two conflicting demands made
upon the appellate process. Speed is facilitated by the original deci-
sion making body, which is familiar with the proceedings, hearing
appeals from its own decisions. Such appeals could be heard im-
mediately after the rendering of a decision. But, if appeals are, per-
mitted, speed or impartiality appear mutually exclusive. The solution
may lie in restricting the grounds for appeal, especially with respect
to appeals on procedural matters, such as in the Cuban system. Such
a solution would require extensive re-education of the public and
lawyers to the concept that appeals are a privilege, not a right.
CONCLUSION
The proposals which have been advanced for preventative legisla-
tion and bodies of limited jurisdiction to deal with particular types of
disputes, in which governmental units will underwrite the costs of
access and the expenses of the dispute resolving machinery, point to
continued bureaucratization and estrangement from the public of the
conflict resolution process. Access to competent dispute resolution
bodies will be provided to the public, but a lack of identification with
the process might be heightened because of the impersonal nature of
specialized bodies which may neglect the psychological needs of the
parties in the interest of fact finding and decision-making. Neverthe-
less, significant improvements are possible in low-synergy cultures
like that of the United States. Through the demystification and reas-
sessment of the adversary process, simplification of laws and proce-
dures, and adoption of synergistic concepts, the ideal of expeditious,
inexpensive conflict resolution systems which meet human needs may
become reality.
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